The word "reconciliation" continues to figure prominently both in the literature and the practice of transitional justice, despite a lack of consensus about what the term exactly means, what activities it encompasses, or what achieving such a condition would require. The ICTJ is working to articulate a definition of reconciliation and to understand the ways in which it can be achieved in practice.

In the view of the ICTJ:

• Reconciliation is something that occurs in the civic or political sphere, rather than at the level of individuals.

• Legitimate reconciliation must be distinguished from efforts to use reconciliation as a substitute for justice.

• There cannot be significant inequities in the distribution of the burdens that reconciliation inevitably entails. It cannot involve transferring responsibilities from perpetrators to victims.

• Reconciliation efforts should not focus unduly on wiping the slate clean. It is not reasonable to seek unqualified closure or a comprehensive ideal of social harmony.

• Reconciliation cannot be reduced to a state of mind, nor can it expect extraordinary attributes on the part of those being reconciled.

• Reconciliation must be articulated in terms that do not depend entirely on a particular set of religious beliefs.

For the ICTJ, the civic trust model of reconciliation best incorporates these criteria.

Civic Trust Model of Reconciliation

Trust involves more than relying on a person to do or refrain from doing certain things; it also involves the expectation of a commitment to shared norms and values. The sense of trust at issue here is not the profound sense of trust characteristic of relations between intimates, but rather, 'civic' trust, which can develop among citizens who are members of the same political community but are nonetheless strangers to one another.

Civic trust includes 'horizontal' trust among citizens and also 'vertical' trust between citizens and their institutions. How is the latter to be understood if trust involves something that is possible only among individuals? To trust an institution amounts to knowing that its constitutive rules, values, and norms are shared by participants and that they regard them as binding.

In this view, reconciliation is the condition under which citizens can once again trust one another as citizens. That means that they are sufficiently committed to the norms and values that motivate their ruling institutions; sufficiently confident that those who operate those institutions do so also on this basis; and sufficiently secure about their fellow citizens' commitment to abide by these basic norms and values.

What are the advantages of thinking of reconciliation in this way?

This view treats reconciliation as more than just a state of mind. It forces us to examine the preconditions of trustworthiness, and hence of reconciliation. The question is: what can be done to make institutions trustworthy and to increase the possibility that citizens will trust them and one another in the aftermath of violence?

It is reasonable to think that trust would increase through the visibly effective implementation of transitional justice initiatives like criminal accountability, truth-telling, reparations, and institutional reform. Such initiatives are likely to contribute to civic trust, because trust in institutions depends on their ability to demonstrate not only that they rest on legitimate norms, but also on their capacity to make these norms effective.

A conception of reconciliation that hinges on the trustworthiness of institutions will not lend itself to be offered as a substitute for justice; nor is it likely to lead to an inequitable burdening of victims; nor does it rest on the idea that the slate has been wiped clean. Strictly speaking, it does not require, although it may lead to, forgiveness.

Transitional justice measures such as these significantly increase the willingness of citizens to place their trust in a common political project and in state institutions that have protected their fundamental rights. It does not matter how much we talk about restorative justice, reconciliation, apologies, or pardons; it is necessary to give citizens reasons to trust again. Only then can we properly conceive of reconciliation.

(Updated Feb 06)